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Abstract 
Does rhetoric highlighting social norms or mentioning science in a communication affect 
individuals’ beliefs about global warming and / or willingness to take action? We draw from 
framing theory and collective-interest models of action to motivate hypotheses that are tested in 
two large web-based survey-experiments using convenience samples. Our results show that 
attitudes about global warming, support for policies that would reduce carbon emissions, and 
behavioral intentions to take voluntary action are strongly affected by norm-based and science-
based interventions. This has implications for information campaigns targeting voluntary efforts 
to promote lifestyle changes that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
Keywords: Collective action, global warming, climate change, social norms, boomerang effects
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Mounting scientific evidence suggests that global warming poses significant threats to 
humans and the wider environment. Nonetheless, opinion polls reveal a growing skepticism 
among the U.S. public about whether global warming is actually occurring, and if it is, whether 
human activities are the main cause of the observed warming trend over the past 150 years.
1
 
With skepticism on the rise, questions remain about what – if anything – can be done to 
influence public attitudes and behaviors toward global warming. Because climate represents an 
important common pool resource, understanding (and indeed, shaping) individuals’ attitudes and 
behavioral intentions regarding global warming is critical. 
What factors shape citizens’ attitudes toward action on global warming? We theorize that 
norm-based communications can influence willingness to take action for the public good – e.g., 
encouraging voluntary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and support for public policies 
targeting the nation’s emissions. We focus on the issue of global warming because it presents a 
severe collective action problem: individuals alone cannot control the climate, and the 
recommended behaviors may have high costs and the benefits are non-excludable (Lubell et al., 
2007). This paper has three interrelated contributions. First, it explores the role that 
communications that invoke social norms play in shaping individuals’ attitudes and willingness 
to take action on global warming.
2
  Second, we assess how global warming communications 
affect individuals’ attitudes and willingness to act. These outcomes matter both to the extent that 
individual attitudes and behavioral intentions with regard to global warming matter from a policy 
perspective and because they reflect public beliefs about science and scientific evidence, which 
matter in their own right (Bauer et al., 2007; Pielke, 2007; Sarewitz, 2000; 2004). Third, given 
                                               
1
 “Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming,” The Pew Research Center, 
October 22, 2009: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1386/cap-and-trade-global-warming-opinion.   
2
 We use the term “global warming” as opposed to “climate change” throughout.  Recent 
experimental evidence suggests that partisans may respond differentially to such changes in 
question wording (Schuldt et al. 2011).  
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the partisan divide in America on the issue of global warming, we explore the potential linkages 
between partisanship and these communications. That is to say, we do not examine the divide per 
se but instead consider under what potential conditions that divide might be mitigated by norm- 
and/or science-based communications. 
In pursuit of the goals outlined above, we present two large survey experiments. 
Experiment 1 tests how norms shape attitudes and behavioral intentions toward global warming. 
We find that a norm-based communication that discourages action, e.g., by providing 
information that others are not cooperating, significantly reduces perceptions of efficacy and 
willingness to take action. Experiment 2 further tests the effects of norm-based communications 
in tandem with messages about the scientific consensus surrounding global warming. We begin 
by discussing the connections between collective action, norms, and global warming, then 
discuss the design of the experiments, and discuss the results thereof. 
Norms and Collective Action on Global Warming 
We focus on the determinants of behavior taken to secure a public good: any good that 
cannot feasibly be withheld from others in a group if it is provided for any member of that group 
(Olson, 1965).  Individuals will tend to cooperate on this collective action problem only when 
they believe that others are also likely to cooperate (Kogut & Beyth-Marom, 2008; Alpizar et al, 
2008; Axelrod, 1984; Frey & Meier, 2004; Shang & Croson, 2009).  In a number of social 
comparison treatments in large-scale field experiments which examine how information about 
the behavior of others affects energy and water conservation,
3
 it has been found that giving 
consumers feedback on their consumption, providing information on energy savings 
opportunities, comparing their use to their neighbors’ use, facilitating public or private goal 
setting, and structuring commitment devices causes households to reduce consumption between 
                                               
3
 See, for example, Nolan et al. (2008) and Stern (2007). 
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5 – 20 percent (Allcott, 2010). Thus, immediate action is taken by citizens when they are 
convinced that others will commit; however, we know little about how responsive individuals are 
to behavior change communications (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000; Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010) and, 
in particular, how individuals respond to behavior change communications concerning climate 
change. 
Research on the factors that promote private action for the public good indicates that 
social norms often play a central role – e.g., providing cues about the efficacy of a collective 
action (Nolan et al., 2008; Cialdini, 2003). Here, “norms” refer to how most people behave in a 
given social context, but they are not uniform. Social psychologists refer to information 
describing how most people act in a decision context as a descriptive norm, while injunctive 
norms refer to information about how people ought to behave in a situation, regardless of how 
people are actually behaving (Cialdini, 2003).  Norms can be especially strong in situations in 
which an individual’s action causes negative effects on the lives of others and thus evolve in 
communities as a way to regulate social life (Biel & Thogersen, 2006; Thogersen, 2008).  In 
these situations, norms serve to restrain egoistic impulses and induce cooperation among group 
members.
4
 
Our research is novel in that it is one of the first attempts to shape beliefs and intentions 
to take action on global warming in an experimental context. To understand how exposure to 
communications invoking social norms, or highlighting the science related to global warming, 
affects opinions and willingness to take action, we develop a framework that links framing 
theory (Chong & Druckman, 2007) with expectancy-value models of collective action (Finkel et 
                                               
4
 Norms also trigger social influence processes when people monitor and regulate their behavior 
so as to avoid sanctions from others (Green & Gerber, 2010; Noelle-Neumann, 1984).  Norms 
create “social pressure” due to the fact that humans tend to praise those who uphold norms and 
scorn those who violate them. 
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al., 1989; Lubell, 2002; Lubell et al., 2007).  First, in deciding whether or not to take a collective 
action, individuals evaluate the costs and benefits likely associated with the outcome from taking 
action (Ajzen & Fishbein 2005).  In doing so, individuals form an attitude toward a specific 
behavior (i.e., an evaluation toward the target) that is a function of accessible considerations.  
For instance, in deciding whether to voluntarily reduce one’s own personal travel as a way to 
combat global warming, an individual may consider the positive effects such actions might have 
for the collective environment or the personal costs associated with such sacrifices.  
Framing theory also explains that one’s overall attitude toward any object is a function of 
the salience and weight attached to various considerations toward the object.  Thus, exposure to 
rhetoric – i.e., persuasive communications targeting attitude change – can affect one’s attitude 
toward a behavior either through altering the salience associated with a particular consideration 
(i.e., a framing effect, see Druckman (2001, 2004) or through persuasion via attitude change 
(O’Keefe 2002). Our research goals necessitate the wedding of framing theory to collective-
interest models of political and environmental action, not unlike Finkel et al. (1989), Lubell 
(2002), and Lubell et al. (2007).  This literature explains that individuals consider not only the 
personal costs and benefits associated with taking a collective action, but also collective interest 
calculations such as the likelihood one’s own actions will influence collective outcomes as well 
as the likelihood of the group achieving success.  Communications that highlight social norms or 
scientific evidence may directly influence one’s attitude toward and willingness to take collective 
action on the environment by altering the cost-benefit calculus at the individual level. 
Based on this framework, we make the following predictions:     
Hypothesis 1a: A norm-based communication promoting action to reduce the nation’s 
greenhouse gas emissions will increase individuals’ beliefs that taking action toward 
global warming is efficacious (i.e., makes a difference).   
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Hypothesis 1b: A norm-based communication discouraging action to reduce the nation’s 
greenhouse gas emissions will decrease individuals’ beliefs that taking action toward 
global warming is efficacious (i.e., makes a difference). 
 
Again, we argue that norms provide a signal about the willingness of others to cooperate in 
securing a public good.  When others are perceived as taking action, individuals will be more 
likely to take action for the public good because their behavior is perceived as efficacious – i.e., 
as making a difference in terms of the collective outcome; when others are perceived as not 
cooperating, individuals will be less likely to take costly action for a public good.   
Hypothesis 2a: A norm-based communication promoting action to reduce the nation’s 
greenhouse gas emissions will increase individuals’ willingness to take action for the 
public good (e.g., drive a smaller vehicle and support a carbon tax).   
 
Hypothesis 2b: A norm-based communication discouraging action to reduce the nation’s 
greenhouse gas emissions will decrease individuals’ willingness to take action for the 
public good (e.g., drive a smaller vehicle and support a carbon tax). 
 
 In addition to norms, information about a scientific consensus regarding the existence of 
global warming should also directly affect the public’s attitudes and behavior. First, 
communications highlighting the views of a credible group – scientists conducting research on 
the phenomena of global warming, for instance – may increase the perceived strength of 
communications promoting action (Lupia & McCubbins 1998; Zaller 1992).  It may also 
influence individuals’ attitudes about the existence and anthropogenic causes of global warming, 
which according to our cost-benefit model of collective action should increase the likelihood of 
motivating individual action.  Thus, we make the following predictions:  
Hypothesis 3: Invoking beliefs among scientists about the existence and causes of global 
warming will increase individuals’ beliefs that global warming is occurring and 
anthropogenic. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Invoking beliefs among scientists about the existence and causes of global 
warming will increase individuals’ willingness to take action for the public good (e.g., 
drive a smaller vehicle and support a carbon tax). 
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Finally, there is a clear partisan divide in America with regard to the anthropogenic 
nature and potentially harmful effects of global warming (Dunlap & McCright, 2008; Krosnick 
et al, 2000; Klick & Smith, 2010; Villar & Krosnick, 2010), and we therefore expect party 
identification will play a significant moderating role on the effects of social norms and science-
related communications about global warming.  The lack of public engagement on this issue may 
be, in part, attributable to ineffective frames in the debate over global warming (Nisbet & 
Scheufele, 2009; Malka et al., 2009; Nisbet 2009). Alternatively, it could simply be a function of 
one’s party affiliation, which has been found to have significant (Nisbet & Goidel, 2007) and 
insignificant (Evans, 2011) effects on the receipt of scientific information. We approach this at 
an exploratory level to the extent that we are looking not only at the effects of social norms on 
beliefs and willingness to act on global warming, but also at the interaction of such norms with 
scientific communications. To our knowledge, few examinations of potential linkages between 
partisanship and the receipt of these kinds of communications have been conducted. An 
exception is Hart and Nisbet (2011) who find that Republicans and Democrats respond 
differently to communications targeting action on global warming.  Another exception is a recent 
study which finds that Republicans households in California increased their energy consumption 
in response to a norm-based social comparison intervention designed to promote conservation; 
the intervention significantly reduced consumption among Democrats (Costa & Kahn, 2012). 
Exploratory Hypothesis: Republicans are more likely than Democrats to discount (or 
react negatively to) social norms and science-based communications promoting action on 
global warming. 
 
Data / Methods 
We test our predictions in two large survey experiments involving 622 and 390 
undergraduate students, respectively, at Georgia State University in December, 2010 and 
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December, 2011. Participants for the two studies were recruited from a first-year political 
science course, which is required for all students at the university.
5
 Participants who chose to 
participate were compensated with extra course credit for their participation.
6
 
Experiment 1, which tests Hypotheses 1 and 2, contained two manipulations: (1) the 
direction of a norm toward action on global warming – i.e., Americans were described as either 
willing or unwilling to take specific actions toward global warming (e.g., drive smaller vehicles 
and support a tax on carbon); and, (2) the content of the communication itself – i.e., either a 
descriptive norm communication alone or a combination of descriptive and injunctive 
communication components.
7
 Table 1 outlines the designs for each experiment, treatment group 
sample sizes, and reiterates our expectations regarding treatment effects relative to a baseline 
(control group) not exposed to any treatment. Students were randomly assigned to one of the 
treatment groups or the control group. Those in the pro norm conditions read the following 
paragraph of text: 
A recent poll showed that over 85% of Americans believe that the world’s average 
temperature is rising primarily because of human activities.  In addition, the vast majority 
                                               
5
 We acknowledge that the use of student participants inevitably raises questions about external 
validity; however, student subjects do not necessarily pose a problem for a study’s external 
validity.  Druckman and Kam (2011: 41) explain that “any convenience sample poses a problem 
only when the size of an experimental treatment effect depends on a characteristic on which the 
convenience sample has virtually no variance.” Given that our sample is skewed toward well-
educated individuals who are likely to hold crystallized attitudes on this issue, any treatment 
effects we uncover are likely a conservative estimate of the impact of the content of these 
communications on related attitudes and behaviors among the general population.    
6
 For Experiment 1, the average age of participants was 20 years old (Std. dev. = 4.59).  Sixty-
four percent of the sample was comprised of females and 36% males.  Democrats comprised 
68% of the sample, Independents 10%, and Republicans 22%.  The composition of Experiment 2 
is nearly identical to that of Experiment 1. Data and replication code for all analyses are 
available on the Dataverse Network. 
7
 Although we anticipate the combination of the descriptive and injunctive communication 
content will result in the largest treatment effects, we do not list these expectations as hypotheses 
above because there is little research that explores the differential impact of various types of 
norm-based communications (but see Schultz et al., 2007; Cialdini et al., 2004). 
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of respondents said they would consider driving smaller cars, reducing travel, and 
supporting legislation (e.g., a tax) to reduce the nation’s emission of greenhouse gases.  
 
Those in the injunctive norm condition additionally read that: “Respondents said the most 
important reason for taking these actions is because it is “the right thing to do for all of us.” 
Those in the con norm conditions similarly read that: 
 
A recent poll showed that less than 15% of Americans believe that the world’s average 
temperature is rising primarily because of human activities.  In addition, only a small 
minority of respondents said they would consider driving smaller cars, reducing travel, 
and supporting legislation (e.g., a tax) to reduce the nation’s emission of greenhouse 
gases.   
 
Those in the con injunctive condition additionally read that: “Respondents said the main reason 
they are unwilling to take these actions is because reducing our standards of living is the “wrong 
thing to do.” 
Experiment 2, which further tested Hypotheses 3-5, also contained two manipulations: 
(1) the inclusion or exclusion of a pro social norm toward action on global warming similar to 
that mentioned above; and, (2) the inclusion or exclusion of the science-based information about 
global warming indicating that scientists have achieved a consensus that global warming is 
occurring (a “science” communication). Those in the social norm condition read the following 
paragraph of text:  
A 2010 report by the Pew Research Group found that a solid majority of Americans 
(59%) believe the Earth is experiencing a long-term warming trend because of humans’ 
activities. The poll also showed that the vast majority of Americans are willing to drive a 
smaller car and support legislation that taxes polluters of greenhouse gases.  
 
Those in the science-based communication group read the following: 
A 2010 report by the Pew Research Group found that the vast majority of scientists (over 
90%) believe the Earth is experiencing a long-term warming trend. Indeed, there is broad 
scientific consensus about this issue and nearly all research conclusively finds that the 
planet will continue to warm over time. 
DOING WHAT OTHERS DO  10 
 
 
Finally, those in the social norm and science condition read both paragraphs.
8
 Those in the no-
norm/no-science condition simply answered the outcome questions. As was the case for 
Experiment 1, students were randomly assigned to one of the treatment groups or the control 
group. 
 
Table 1. Experimental Design and Predictions 
Experiment 1 
 Pro Norm Con Norm 
Descriptive Increase action relative to 
baseline (n=117) 
Decrease relative to 
baseline (n=135) 
Descriptive + Injunctive Largest increase relative to 
baseline (n=153) 
Largest decrease relative to 
baseline (n=140) 
Control Group (No norm) Baseline (n=77) 
 
Experiment 2 
 No Social Norm Social Norm 
No Information 
Baseline (n=97) 
Increase relative to baseline 
(n=92) 
Scientific Consensus 
Communication 
Increase relative to baseline 
(n=109) 
Largest increase relative to 
baseline (n=92) 
 
Note that neither experiment emphasizes the source of information. Instead, we present 
non-partisan polling information about what Americans, scientists, or both feel about global 
warming’s anthropogenic nature and potential effects. We acknowledge that global warming is 
so politically charged (in the United States) that it may not make a difference as to the source 
                                               
8
 They read the norm-based paragraph first and the science-based paragraph was modified 
slightly for readability to say “The same report” instead of repeating “A 2010 report by the Pew 
Research Group” in each paragraph. 
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and/or content (Mutz, 2008), but we expect that this method reduces any potential confounding 
effects.  
In both experiments, we included two key dependent measures of individuals’ 
willingness to take action. The first measure taps support for a carbon emissions cap, “even if it 
increases costs to consumers” (1-7 scale, where 1= strongly oppose, 7= strongly support) and the 
second measure explores behavioral intentions to change one’s habits (e.g., driving habits) as a 
way to reduce carbon emissions (1-7 scale, where 1=extremely unlikely, 7=extremely likely). 
For Experiment 1 only, we measured perceptions about the efficacy of action with two 
measures. The first asked participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed with a 
statement that taking personal action has an impact on the nation’s carbon emission (1-7 scale, 
where 1= strongly disagree, and 7=strongly agree).
9
  The second item measures expected 
behavioral reciprocity from others by asking participants to respond to a statement about whether 
their actions “encourage others in my community” to take actions to reduce carbon emissions (1-
7 scale, where 1=strongly disagree, and 7=strongly agree).   
Both experiments also included two belief items: (1) belief about whether global 
warming is happening (where 1=definitely is not happening, and 7= definitely is happening), and 
(2), if it is happening, whether the trend is a result of human activities or natural changes (1-7 
scale, where 1=definitely naturally induced, and 7=definitely human induced). 
All variables were measured on seven-point scales, exact wordings for which can be 
found in the Appendix. For the analysis, all variables are rescaled from -1 to +1 to ease 
interpretability. In presenting the results, we report treatment effects as linear regression 
coefficients controlling for partisanship (as well the interactions between partisanship and the 
                                               
9
 This item taps perceived personal influence, which has been associated with environmental 
activism (Lubell et al., 2007), voting behavior (Opp, 2001), and willingness to engage in other 
forms of collective action (Finkel et al., 1989). 
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treatment indicators). We report linear regression results, following the advice of Angrist and 
Pischke (2009), and rely on bootstrapped (n=2000) standard errors to avoid imposing parametric 
assumptions on our inference. The reported results are robust to alternative functional forms, 
including ordered probit regression. For both experiments, we include party identification as a 
control.
10
  
Results 
 Our hypotheses anticipated that beliefs and behaviors toward global warming would be 
influenced by norm-based and science-based communications. The stickiness of global warming 
beliefs (and to a lesser extent behavioral intentions) is, however, reflected in our relatively mixed 
findings. We begin with results from Experiment 1, which tests our norm-based hypotheses and 
explores the influence of partisanship, before turning to Experiment 2, which further tests those 
hypotheses as well as our predictions regarding science-based communications.  
  
                                               
10
 Party identification in our samples was distributed as follows. For Experiment 1, 22.0% of the 
sample identified as Republicans, 67.5% identified as Democrats, and the remainder identified as 
politically independent. For Experiment 2, 24.1% of the sample identified as Republicans, 67.7% 
as Democrats, and the remainder as politically independent. 
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Table 2. Treatment Effects (Experiment 1) 
 
Perceived 
Personal 
Influence 
Expected 
Reciprocity 
Believe 
Global 
Warming is 
Happening 
Believe  
Global Warming  
is Human 
Induced 
Support Cap  
on Carbon 
Emissions 
Willingness 
to Take 
Personal 
Action 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.38** 
(0.06) 
0.23** 
(0.06) 
0.37** 
(0.07) 
0.25** 
(0.07) 
0.28** 
(0.07) 
0.20** 
(0.07) 
Pro Descriptive (D) -0.04 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
Pro Descriptive + 
Injunctive (D+I) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
Con D -0.18** 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.16** 
(0.09) 
-0.17** 
(0.09) 
Con D+I -0.10 
(0.08) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
PartyID 0.21** 
(0.08) 
0.21** 
(0.08) 
0.28** 
(0.11) 
0.31** 
(0.09) 
0.21** 
(0.10) 
0.13* 
(0.09) 
PartyID * Pro D -0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
-0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
PartyID * Pro D+I -0.10 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.14 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
PartyID * Con D -0.10 
(0.11) 
-0.19** 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.14) 
-0.10 
(0.13) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.13) 
PartyID * Con D+I -0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.21** 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
SER .48 .47 .52 .53 .51 .54 
n 612 612 612 611 612 612 
*p<.10, **p<.05, one-tailed test 
Note: D = Descriptive, I = Injunctive. Cell entries are unstandardized linear regression coefficients with bootstrapped 
standard errors in parentheses. Baseline is the control condition. Party identification is coded with seven categories 
from Republican (-1) to Independent (0) to Democrat (+1). SER is the Standard Error of the Regression (Beck, 2010). 
 
While we expected norms promoting action to influence both beliefs (Hypothesis 1a) and 
behavioral intentions (Hypothesis 2a), we find little support our hypotheses. Table 2 reports 
regression results with indicators for each treatment condition (relative to a control condition), 
including a control for party identification. Looking at the rows for the Pro Norm conditions, we 
do not see any effect on any outcome. Indeed for several outcomes (perceived personal influence 
and support for a carbon emissions tax), we find effects in the opposite direction of our 
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expectations at a non-significant level. Norm-based communications that stress others’ actions to 
affect global warming appear to have little impact on individuals’ attitudes or behavioral 
intentions.
11
 
In contrast, when communications invoke con norms, in which other Americans are 
characterized as unwilling to take action on global warming, there are some quite interesting 
patterns.  The descriptive con norm treatments (as seen in Table 2) significantly reduced 
perceived personal influence on global warming (p<.05), consistent with our Hypothesis 1b.  The 
descriptive con norm treatment also significantly reduced support for a carbon emissions tax 
(p<.05) and willingness to take personal action (p<.05), consistent with Hypothesis 2b. Effects 
were also in the expected direction (though not statistically significant) for some of the other 
outcomes. We had no clear expectations about the different effects of descriptive versus 
injunctive norms and the results here suggest that descriptive rather than injunctive norms are 
more efficacious with regard to global warming-related attitudes. 
While there are not consistent effects from each of the treatments, the results suggest that 
norms may have the potential to influence beliefs and behaviors, though only under particular 
conditions. The con norms, in particular, seem to have powerful effects. A separate analysis, 
pooling all pro norm conditions and the control group (which does not differ significantly from 
the pro norm conditions on most measures) compared to the pooled con norm conditions, shows 
that con norms suppressed belief that global warming was human induced (p=.02), willingness to 
take personal action (p=.06), support for an emissions cap (p=.11),
12
 perceived personal 
influence (p=.00), and expected reciprocity (p=.08). While most research (including our 
                                               
11
 We present in the appendix (“Robustness Checks”) a series of alternative specifications to 
confirm the findings presented in Table 2 above and Table 3 below. 
12
 Though a p-value above .10 is typically deemed non-significant, comparisons of significant to 
non-significant results has been criticized by statisticians (see, for example, Gelman & Stern 
(2009)). 
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Experiment 2) has focused on the positive impacts of pro norms, these findings suggest con 
norms are particularly important. The results presented in Table 2 also suggest that party 
identification has a strong impact on global warming-related outcomes. Figure 1 presents the 
means scores by party within each treatment for belief that global warming is happening, belief 
that it is human induced, support for an emissions cap, and willingness to take personal action. 
Again, con norms without an injunctive statement tend to push Republicans further negative on 
these measures. We take up the impact of party identification in greater detail below. 
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Figure 1. Conditional Influence of Partisanship on Global Warming Belief 
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Table 3. Treatment Effects (Experiment 2) 
 Believe Global 
Warming is 
Happening 
Believe  
Global Warming  
is Human 
Induced 
Support Cap  
on Carbon 
Emissions 
Willingness to 
Take Personal 
Action 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.40** 
(0.05) 
0.17** 
(0.06) 
0.38** 
(0.05) 
0.19** 
(0.06) 
Norm / No Science -0.13* 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.23** 
(0.09) 
No Norm / Science 0.08 
(0.07) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.12** 
(0.07) 
0.17** 
(0.09) 
Norm / Science 0.05 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
0.18** 
(0.08) 
Party ID 0.18** 
(0.07) 
0.36** 
(0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.08) 
0.26** 
(0.09) 
Party ID * Norm / No Science 0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.17* 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
-0.17* 
(0.13) 
Party ID * No Norm / Science -0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.27** 
(0.12) 
-0.15* 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.13) 
Party ID * Norm / Science -0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.31** 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
SER .46 .48 .46 .42 
n 382 382 382 382 
*p<.10, **p<.05, one-tailed test 
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized linear regression coefficients with bootstrapped standard errors in 
parentheses. Baseline is the control (no norm / no science) treatment condition. Party identification is coded with 
seven categories from Republican (-1) to Independent (0) to Democrat (+1). SER is the Standard Error of the 
Regression (Beck, 2010). 
 
Recall that Experiment 2 tested the impact of communications that invoked pro norms, 
which showed little impact in Experiment 1, in combination with messages that communicate 
scientific consensus about global warming. We find additional evidence that beliefs and 
behavioral intentions about global warming are quite sticky, even in the face of both pro norm 
and scientific communications. We again examine Hypotheses 1a and 2a regarding the effects of 
pro norms and provide our first tests of Hypotheses 3 and 4, regarding science-based messages. 
As is clear in Table 3, the effects of our manipulations are generally not statistically significant 
except on our measure of willingness to take action. As is clear from the large, positive, and 
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statistically significant coefficients on party identification, much of the variation in all four 
outcomes is explained by partisan differences (as it was also the case in Experiment 1). Yet, at 
least as it relates to willing to take personal action, a pro norm significantly increases behavioral 
intent (p<.05). That the size of this effect is comparable to the effect of a scientific consensus 
message alone (p<.05) or both the norm and science message together (p<.05) suggests that 
efforts to influence personal behavior with regard to global warming can benefit from either 
approach. Yet the combination of these communications appears to have little added benefit: the 
strongest effects seem to come from the pro norm alone (providing support for Hypothesis 2a, 
but little for Hypothesis 4). This is consistent with the evidence from Experiment 1 that (con) 
descriptive norms alone had the largest and most significant effects on outcomes. The evidence 
thus lends little support to the expectations (as outlined in Hypotheses 3 and 4) that 
communicating scientific consensus has an impact on beliefs, attitudes, or behavioral intentions. 
 Finally, we turn to the question of partisan moderation effects – the “boomerang effect” 
(Hart & Nisbet, 2011) – that we described in our exploratory hypothesis. In both experiments, 
party identification was consistently and significantly associated with higher scores on all 
outcome measures (that is, Democrats reported higher scores on measures of beliefs, attitudes, 
and behavioral intentions).
13
 As an example, strong Democrats in the control condition reported, 
on average, a score 0.52 points higher on willingness to take personal action than strong 
Republicans, a full 25% of the response scale. (We find a similar pattern of partisan effects in 
Experiment 1.) 
These results are perhaps unsurprising given prior evidence of a partisan divide on global 
warming. More interesting are interactions between partisanship and the treatment indicators, 
                                               
13
 This pattern is clear in the coefficients for party identification, which indicate the effect of 
partisanship in the baseline/control conditions of both experiments. 
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which report the effect of partisanship under each type of norm-based communication. Our 
results suggest an interesting pattern that runs somewhat contrary to Hart and Nisbet’s (2011) 
boomerang hypothesis. In the regression models reported in Tables 2 and 3, we can interpret 
each coefficient on an interaction term (between partisanship and a treatment) as follows: a 
coefficient of zero implies no partisan differences in the outcome (i.e., under that treatment, 
Democrats and Republicans do not significantly differ from one another), a positive coefficient 
indicates that the treatment exacerbates partisan differences (e.g., Democrats are even more 
willing to take action and Republicans less than they otherwise would be), while a negative 
coefficient on an interaction implies that the treatment reduces partisan differences.
14
  These 
coefficients indicate that norm communications (in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) and 
scientific consensus communications (in Experiment 2) undercut partisan differences.
15
 In 
Experiment 1, partisan differences are almost entirely eliminated by norm-based 
communications for perceived personal influence, expected reciprocity, and belief that global 
warming is anthropogenic. In Experiment 2, we find a similar pattern for both willingness to take 
action and belief that global warming is anthropogenic. With regard to willingness to take action, 
a pro norm alone nearly eliminates partisan differences in behavioral intention though the other 
treatments have less dramatic effects. Much more dramatic are the effects of norms and science 
communications in reducing partisan differences in belief that global warming is happening, in 
belief that global warming is human induced, in support for an emissions cap, and in willingness 
to change, all from Experiment 2. We display this pattern in Figure 2, which shows the mean 
scores by party within each treatment condition. Looking at the plot whether global warming is 
                                               
14
 In the control condition, the overall effect of partisanship is simply the coefficient on the party 
identification variable. In the other conditions, the overall effect is the sum of the coefficient on 
partisanship and the coefficient for the interaction. 
15
 These are not driven by differences in knowledge, which we present in the appendix (see 
“Robustness Checks”, Experiment 2, column 6). 
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human induced, in particular, shows that combinations of science and norm-based 
communications can be particularly powerful in mitigating the partisan divide about global 
warming. And, norms alone are nearly sufficient to bridge the divide on willingness to take 
personal action, whereas science alone is sufficient to bridge the (smaller) divide on support for a 
carbon emissions cap. 
 
Figure 2. Conditional Influence of Partisanship on Global Warming Belief 
 
    
 
 
  
 
As either a pro norm or a science communication are added, partisan differences are 
significantly reduced. When both are expressed, there are almost no partisan differences in belief 
that global warming is anthropogenic. Though both experiments showed that pro norms seem to 
have minimal ability to increase the public’s aggregate beliefs and attitudes about global 
warming, they may undercut partisan differences on the issue, which are known to be severe. 
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This suggests that these types of communications are effective even on those who are 
predisposed to not believe in global warming. As well, given that it is Republicans who are 
responding to the science-only treatment in most cases, we reject Hart and Nisbet’s (2011) 
boomerang hypothesis. 
Discussion 
 Despite the frequently null effects, the results of our experiments do show that norm-
based treatments can to some extent directly shape beliefs, policy support, intentions, and 
actions.  Supporting previous work, perceptions of efficacy appear to be central to the process by 
which norms influence behavior in collective action settings (Finkel et al., 1989; Lubell et al., 
2007; Lubell 2002).  It is especially important to read the results in the context of the particular 
issue under examination. Global warming is not a new issue nor is one that individuals are likely 
to be unfamiliar with or have no attitudes about. To the extent that individuals’ attitudes toward 
these types of issues are well-formed and strongly held, it can be quite difficult to influence 
attitudes and behavioral intentions (Druckman & Leeper, 2012a). While much experimental 
work avoids these types of issues to focus instead on novel or obscure issues (Druckman & 
Leeper, 2012b), our interest in collective action necessitates a focus on a real and important 
issue. That we find any treatment effects at all and that some of those effects are large suggests 
the potential of norm-based communications to influence even well-entrenched social dilemmas. 
The results regarding con norms are particularly important: Experiment 1 clearly demonstrates 
that when others are perceived as less supportive of a carbon tax or driving less, individuals are 
significantly less likely to support or engage in the collective endeavor themselves. Norms can 
both serve to solve and exacerbate collective action problems. Experiment 2 showed that 
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science-based communications, which are commonly referenced in discussions of global 
warming, are relatively less influential. 
Additionally, the absence of consistently significant main effects of the treatments for 
both experiments reveals challenges in properly measuring beliefs and willingness to act. These 
hazards are well documented in the existing research, of which the preponderance of null effects 
here is additional evidence. It is also possible, though, that the null effects are due to the 
apolitical nature of the treatments (i.e., non-partisan polls; Montpetit (2011)). Without an 
identifiable media source, participants in our experiments had little basis for evaluating the 
credibility or trustworthiness of the communications they received. This could create a problem, 
especially as information source plays a significant role in how citizens judge scientific evidence 
(Nisbet & Goidel, 2007). Particularly in light of evidence that partisanship biases the acceptance 
of science-based communications (Nisbet, 2005; Jasanoff, 2011), and that the politicization of 
science-based communications is a key confounding mechanism (Kitcher, 2001; Jasanoff & 
Wynne, 1998; Sarewitz, 1996, 2004; Jasanoff, 1987; Pielke, 2002, 2004, 2007), future research 
should explore how the politicization of science, which necessarily involves the partisan 
communication of scientific information, influences public attitudes toward global warming. 
Inconsistencies between the results for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 could be driven 
by differences in the language of the pro-norm treatments, but we suspect that exact percentages 
may not matter. As Kahneman (2011) points out, the human mind does not process numbers well 
but is instead responsive to impressions that anyone (rather than no one) is doing something. 
Attempts to increase external validity are best addressed with an ongoing research program 
replicating these experiments across populations, experimental treatments, and time (Druckman 
and Kam, 2011). 
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This is one of the first studies to explore the causal process by which norms influence 
attitudes and behavior toward the issue of global warming. Though our results are mixed, we 
isolate some conditions where norms do influence beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. Our results 
also highlight the need to focus more on the influence of con norms (from our results in 
Experiment 1), focus on the combination of norm-based and science-based information into 
theorizing about collective action (from our results in Experiment 2), and the need to incorporate 
individuals’ partisanship in work on all of these issues. The results shed light on the process by 
which norms affect behavior in collective action settings, and also provide insight for 
policymakers regarding how communications that promote social comparisons may be used to 
foster voluntary behavior change (e.g., by including information about the efficacy of individual 
action and/or highlighting cooperation by others). Despite the stickiness of attitudes toward 
global warming, norms seem to have some impact on behavioral intentions – the one area where 
individuals are able to make an immediate impact on climate mitigation efforts. 
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Appendix. Question Wordings 
Believe Global Warming is Happening 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2: Global warming refers to the idea that the world’s average 
temperature has been increasing over the past 150 years and may be increasing more in the 
future.” 
How much do you agree with the previous statement? 
strongly 
disagree 
moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
 neither 
disagree 
nor agree 
slightly 
agree 
moderately 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
 
Believe Global Warming is Human Induced 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2: If global warming is happening, to what extent do you think it 
is caused by human activities, as opposed to natural changes in the environment? 
definitely  
human  
induced 
very likely 
human 
induced 
Probably 
human 
induced 
neither 
human 
nor 
naturally 
induced 
probably 
naturally 
induced 
very likely 
naturally 
induced 
definitely 
naturally 
induced 
 
Support for Carbon Emissions Cap 
Experiment 1: To what extent do you oppose or support setting caps on emissions of greenhouse 
gases and forcing companies that exceed the cap to pay other companies or the government, even 
if this increases costs to consumers? 
Experiment 2: To what extent do you oppose or support setting caps on companies’ emissions of 
greenhouse gases?  
Strongly 
oppose 
moderately 
oppose 
Slightly 
Oppose 
 neither 
oppose 
nor support 
slightly 
support 
moderately 
support 
strongly 
support 
 
Willingness to Take Personal Action 
Experiment 1: How likely is it that you will make lifestyle changes such as driving a smaller car 
in order to reduce your own personal carbon emissions? 
Experiment 2: To what extent are you willing to take personal action to reduce your own carbon 
emissions? 
Extremely 
unwilling 
moderately 
unwilling 
Somewhat 
unwilling 
neither 
willing nor 
unwilling 
somewhat 
willing 
moderately 
willing 
extremely 
willing 
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Perceived Personal Influence 
Experiment 1: Indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following statement: 
“Taking actions that reduce my own personal consumption have an impact on the nation’s 
energy situation.”  
strongly 
disagree 
moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
 neither 
disagree 
nor agree 
slightly 
agree 
moderately 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
    
Expected Reciprocity 
Experiment 1: Indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following statement: 
“Taking action to conserve energy encourages others in my community to take similar steps that 
increase our energy independence.”  
strongly 
disagree 
moderately 
disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
 neither 
disagree 
nor agree 
slightly 
agree 
moderately 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
 
Party Identification 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2: Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, 
Independent, or Republican? [Branched question] 
strong 
Democrat 
Weak 
Democrat 
Independent 
leans 
Democrat 
Independent Independent 
leans 
Republican 
weak 
Republican        
strong 
Republican 
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Appendix. Robustness Checks 
 
In order to test the robustness of our regression models, we regressed each dependent variable 
(from both experiments) on several different combinations of independent variables. We report 
these regressions here. Those models are as follows: 
(1) A “treatment effect” model, which regresses each outcome only on indicator variables for 
each treatment condition. 
(2) A “partisan moderation” model, as reported in the body of the paper with a continuous 
measure of partisanship. 
(3) An alternative partisan moderation model, using an indicator variable for party 
identification (1=Democrat). 
(4) A “Republicans-only” model, which examines the effects of each treatment only among 
Republican respondents. 
(5) A “Democrats-only” model, which does the same for Democratic respondents. 
(6) For Experiment 2 only, a model that includes an interaction between our treatment 
indicators and a continuous measure of general political knowledge constructed from 
nine political knowledge questions asked on the survey. (Alternative coding of the 
knowledge measure has no impact on the results). 
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Experiment 1 
 
Perceived Personal Influence 
                         1            2            3            4            5            
Intercept                0.43 (0.06)  0.38 (0.06)  0.17 (0.10)  0.17 (0.11)  0.53 (0.07)  
Pro Desc                 -0.04 (0.07) -0.05 (0.08) -0.05 (0.14) -0.05 (0.15) -0.11 (0.09) 
Pro Desc + Inj           -0.10 (0.07) -0.09 (0.07) 0.04 (0.13)  0.04 (0.14)  -0.15 (0.08) 
Con Desc                 -0.20 (0.07) -0.19 (0.08) -0.08 (0.14) -0.08 (0.15) -0.28 (0.08) 
Con Desc + Inj           -0.12 (0.07) -0.10 (0.07) 0.17 (0.13)  0.17 (0.14)  -0.20 (0.08) 
PartyId                  -            0.21 (0.08)  0.37 (0.12)  -            -            
PartyId * Pro Desc       -            -0.05 (0.11) -0.06 (0.17) -            -            
PartyId * Pro Desc + Inj -            -0.10 (0.11) -0.19 (0.16) -            -            
PartyId * Con Desc       -            -0.10 (0.11) -0.20 (0.16) -            -            
PartyId * Con Desc + nj  -            -0.14 (0.11) -0.36 (0.16) -            -            
SER                      0.49         0.48         0.48         0.52         0.47         
 
Expected Reciprocity 
                         1            2            3            4           5            
Intercept                0.29 (0.05)  0.23 (0.06)  0.04 (0.10)  0.04 (0.10) 0.39 (0.07)  
Pro Desc                 0.03 (0.07)  0.02 (0.08)  0.01 (0.14)  0.01 (0.15) -0.02 (0.08) 
Pro Desc + Inj           0.04 (0.07)  0.06 (0.07)  0.22 (0.13)  0.22 (0.14) -0.01 (0.08) 
Con Desc                 -0.11 (0.07) -0.07 (0.07) 0.08 (0.13)  0.08 (0.14) -0.22 (0.08) 
Con Desc + Inj           0.06 (0.07)  0.11 (0.07)  0.37 (0.13)  0.37 (0.13) -0.06 (0.08) 
PartyId                  -            0.21 (0.08)  0.34 (0.12)  -           -            
PartyId * Pro Desc       -            -0.03 (0.11) -0.04 (0.16) -           -            
PartyId * Pro Desc + Inj -            -0.12 (0.10) -0.23 (0.15) -           -            
PartyId * Con Desc       -            -0.18 (0.11) -0.31 (0.16) -           -            
PartyId * Con Desc + nj  -            -0.21 (0.10) -0.43 (0.15) -           -            
SER                      0.47         0.47         0.46         0.49        0.45         
 
Belief in Global Warming 
                         1            2            3            4            5            
Intercept                0.44 (0.06)  0.37 (0.06)  0.21 (0.11)  0.21 (0.14)  0.58 (0.07)  
Pro Desc                 0.04 (0.08)  0.05 (0.08)  0.05 (0.15)  0.05 (0.19)  -0.04 (0.09) 
Pro Desc + Inj           0.09 (0.08)  0.09 (0.08)  0.05 (0.14)  0.05 (0.18)  0.02 (0.08)  
Con Desc                 -0.03 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) -0.13 (0.15) -0.13 (0.19) -0.09 (0.08) 
Con Desc + Inj           0.06 (0.08)  0.03 (0.08)  -0.01 (0.14) -0.01 (0.18) 0.03 (0.08)  
PartyId                  -            0.28 (0.09)  0.37 (0.13)  -            -            
PartyId * Pro Desc       -            -0.10 (0.12) -0.09 (0.18) -            -            
PartyId * Pro Desc + Inj -            -0.06 (0.11) -0.03 (0.17) -            -            
PartyId * Con Desc       -            0.00 (0.12)  0.05 (0.18)  -            -            
PartyId * Con Desc + nj  -            0.01 (0.11)  0.03 (0.17)  -            -            
SER                      0.54         0.52         0.52         0.65         0.47         
 
Belief that Global Warming is Human Induced  
                         1            2            3            4            5            
Intercept                0.33 (0.06)  0.25 (0.06)  0.11 (0.11)  0.11 (0.13)  0.46 (0.07)  
Pro Desc                 -0.01 (0.08) -0.03 (0.09) -0.14 (0.16) -0.14 (0.18) -0.07 (0.09) 
Pro Desc + Inj           0.05 (0.08)  0.06 (0.08)  0.07 (0.15)  0.07 (0.17)  -0.02 (0.09) 
Con Desc                 -0.06 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) -0.09 (0.15) -0.09 (0.17) -0.13 (0.09) 
Con Desc + Inj           -0.08 (0.08) -0.06 (0.08) -0.07 (0.15) -0.07 (0.16) -0.16 (0.09) 
PartyId                  -            0.31 (0.09)  0.36 (0.14)  -            -            
PartyId * Pro Desc       -            -0.04 (0.12) 0.06 (0.19)  -            -            
PartyId * Pro Desc + Inj -            -0.13 (0.12) -0.09 (0.17) -            -            
PartyId * Con Desc       -            -0.10 (0.12) -0.04 (0.18) -            -            
PartyId * Con Desc + nj  -            -0.15 (0.12) -0.09 (0.17) -            -            
SER                      0.54         0.53         0.53         0.6          0.51         
 
  
DOING WHAT OTHERS DO  32 
 
Support for Emissions Cap 
                         1            2            3            4            5            
Intercept                0.33 (0.06)  0.28 (0.06)  0.17 (0.11)  0.17 (0.13)  0.42 (0.07)  
Pro Desc                 -0.06 (0.08) -0.07 (0.08) -0.07 (0.16) -0.07 (0.18) -0.10 (0.09) 
Pro Desc + Inj           -0.05 (0.07) -0.02 (0.08) 0.04 (0.15)  0.04 (0.17)  -0.11 (0.09) 
Con Desc                 -0.13 (0.08) -0.16 (0.08) -0.31 (0.15) -0.31 (0.17) -0.15 (0.09) 
Con Desc + Inj           -0.05 (0.07) -0.07 (0.08) -0.09 (0.14) -0.09 (0.16) -0.04 (0.09) 
PartyId                  -            0.21 (0.09)  0.25 (0.14)  -            -            
PartyId * Pro Desc       -            -0.04 (0.12) -0.04 (0.18) -            -            
PartyId * Pro Desc + Inj -            -0.13 (0.11) -0.15 (0.17) -            -            
PartyId * Con Desc       -            0.03 (0.12)  0.16 (0.18)  -            -            
PartyId * Con Desc + nj  -            0.01 (0.11)  0.04 (0.17)  -            -            
SER                      0.53         0.51         0.53         0.6          0.5          
 
Willingness to Take Personal Action 
                         1            2            3            4            5            
Intercept                0.23 (0.06)  0.20 (0.07)  0.09 (0.11)  0.09 (0.12)  0.30 (0.08)  
Pro Desc                 0.02 (0.08)  -0.02 (0.09) -0.06 (0.16) -0.06 (0.17) 0.02 (0.10)  
Pro Desc + Inj           -0.03 (0.08) -0.05 (0.08) -0.13 (0.15) -0.13 (0.16) -0.04 (0.09) 
Con Desc                 -0.12 (0.08) -0.17 (0.08) -0.31 (0.16) -0.31 (0.17) -0.10 (0.09) 
Con Desc + Inj           -0.03 (0.08) -0.05 (0.08) -0.01 (0.15) -0.01 (0.16) -0.04 (0.09) 
PartyId                  -            0.13 (0.09)  0.21 (0.14)  -            -            
PartyId * Pro Desc       -            0.05 (0.13)  0.08 (0.19)  -            -            
PartyId * Pro Desc + Inj -            0.04 (0.12)  0.10 (0.18)  -            -            
PartyId * Con Desc       -            0.11 (0.12)  0.21 (0.18)  -            -            
PartyId * Con Desc + nj  -            0.04 (0.12)  -0.03 (0.18) -            -            
SER                      0.55         0.54         0.54         0.57         0.52 
 
  
DOING WHAT OTHERS DO  33 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Belief in Global Warming 
                         1            2            3            4            5            6           
Intercept                0.45 (0.05)  0.40 (0.05)  0.29 (0.09)  0.29 (0.09)  0.50 (0.06)  0.32 (0.13) 
Norm Only                -0.11 (0.07) -0.13 (0.07) -0.20 (0.13) -0.20 (0.13) -0.07 (0.08) 0.08 (0.21) 
Science Only             0.05 (0.07)  0.07 (0.07)  0.16 (0.13)  0.16 (0.13)  0.02 (0.08)  0.03 (0.18) 
Norm + Science           0.03 (0.07)  0.05 (0.07)  -0.03 (0.13) -0.03 (0.13) 0.06 (0.08)  0.15 (0.21) 
PartyId                  -            0.18 (0.07)  0.21 (0.11)  -            -            -           
PartyId * Norm Only      -            0.06 (0.11)  0.14 (0.16)  -            -            -           
PartyId * Science Only   -            -0.11 (0.11) -0.15 (0.15) -            -            -           
PartyId * Norm + Science -            -0.03 (0.10) 0.09 (0.16)  -            -            -           
Knowledge                -            -            -            -            -            0.03 (0.03) 
SER                      0.47         0.46         0.46         0.46         0.46         0.47        
 
Belief that Global Warming is Human Induced 
                         1            2            3            4            5            6            
Intercept                0.27 (0.05)  0.17 (0.05)  -0.11 (0.10) -0.11 (0.10) 0.41 (0.06)  0.30 (0.14)  
Norm Only                -0.02 (0.07) 0.03 (0.08)  0.21 (0.14)  0.21 (0.15)  -0.07 (0.08) 0.05 (0.22)  
Science Only             -0.00 (0.07) 0.06 (0.08)  0.23 (0.14)  0.23 (0.15)  -0.09 (0.08) -0.06 (0.19) 
Norm + Science           -0.00 (0.07) 0.09 (0.08)  0.24 (0.14)  0.24 (0.15)  -0.12 (0.08) -0.04 (0.22) 
PartyId                  -            0.36 (0.08)  0.51 (0.11)  -            -            -            
PartyId * Norm Only      -            -0.18 (0.12) -0.28 (0.16) -            -            -            
PartyId * Science Only   -            -0.26 (0.11) -0.32 (0.16) -            -            -            
PartyId * Norm + Science -            -0.31 (0.11) -0.37 (0.16) -            -            -            
Knowledge                -            -            -            -            -            -0.01 (0.03) 
SER                      0.5          0.48         0.48         0.52         0.47         0.5          
 
Willingness to Take Personal Action 
                         1           2            3            4           5           6           
Intercept                0.26 (0.05) 0.19 (0.05)  0.04 (0.09)  0.04 (0.11) 0.34 (0.05) 0.14 (0.13) 
Norm Only                0.18 (0.07) 0.22 (0.07)  0.28 (0.13)  0.28 (0.17) 0.13 (0.07) 0.25 (0.21) 
Science Only             0.15 (0.07) 0.16 (0.07)  0.19 (0.13)  0.19 (0.17) 0.12 (0.07) 0.21 (0.18) 
Norm + Science           0.14 (0.07) 0.18 (0.07)  0.17 (0.13)  0.17 (0.16) 0.15 (0.08) 0.28 (0.21) 
PartyId                  -           0.26 (0.07)  0.30 (0.11)  -           -           -           
PartyId * Norm Only      -           -0.17 (0.11) -0.15 (0.16) -           -           -           
PartyId * Science Only   -           -0.09 (0.11) -0.07 (0.16) -           -           -           
PartyId * Norm + Science -           -0.09 (0.10) -0.02 (0.16) -           -           -           
Knowledge                -           -            -            -           -           0.03 (0.03) 
SER                      0.47        0.46         0.46         0.57        0.41        0.47        
 
Support for Emissions Cap 
                         1           2            3            4           5           6            
Intercept                0.43 (0.04) 0.38 (0.05)  0.25 (0.08)  0.25 (0.10) 0.50 (0.05) 0.35 (0.12)  
Norm Only                0.05 (0.06) 0.05 (0.07)  0.05 (0.12)  0.05 (0.15) 0.04 (0.07) 0.02 (0.19)  
Science Only             0.06 (0.06) 0.11 (0.07)  0.25 (0.12)  0.25 (0.15) 0.00 (0.06) 0.24 (0.16)  
Norm + Science           0.05 (0.06) 0.07 (0.06)  0.08 (0.12)  0.08 (0.14) 0.04 (0.07) -0.07 (0.19) 
PartyId                  -           0.19 (0.07)  0.25 (0.10)  -           -           -            
PartyId * Norm Only      -           0.00 (0.10)  -0.01 (0.14) -           -           -            
PartyId * Science Only   -           -0.17 (0.10) -0.24 (0.14) -           -           -            
PartyId * Norm + Science -           -0.04 (0.09) -0.04 (0.14) -           -           -            
Knowledge                -           -            -            -           -           0.02 (0.03)  
SER                      0.43        0.42         0.42         0.5         0.39        0.42 
 
